

Unit - 1 Philosophy of mind

Q. What is the nature and scope of philosophy of mind?

Ans. Philosophy of mind is the ^{branch} study of philosophy which studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental properties, consciousness and its relationship to the physical body. It intersects to some extent with the fields of neurobiology, computer science and psychology. Within philosophy, the philosophy of mind is usually combined a part of metaphysics and has been particularly studied by schools of thought such as analytic philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism, although it has been discussed by philosophy from the earliest times. It has a potential influence on philosophical questions such as the nature of death, the nature of free will, the nature of what a person is and his or her identity and the self, and the nature of emotion, perception and memory.

The central issue in ~~the~~ philosophy of mind is the mind-body problem (the relationship of the mind to the body), and the challenge is to explain how a supposedly non-material mind can influence a



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material body and vice-versa. The two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve this problem are Dualism and Monism with Pluralism as a small view-point.

However, there are those notably Ludwig ^{Wittgenstein} ~~investigation~~ and his followers who reject the problem as an illusory one which has arisen purely because mental and biological vocabulary are incompatible, and such illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary, or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts.

The nature of the Philosophy of the mind is a comprehensive and lucid introduction to major themes in the Philosophy of mind. It carefully explores the conflicting positions that have arisen within the debate and locates the argument within their context.

Thus, from the above discussion it is clear that the Philosophy of mind is a branch of Philosophy that studies the ontology and nature of the mind-body problem. It is a paradigmatic issue in Philosophy of mind, although

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a number of other issues are addressed such as the hard problem of consciousness and the nature of particular mental states. Aspects of the mind that are studied include mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and its neural correlates, the ontology of the mind, the nature of cognition and of thought, and the relationship of the mind to the body.

* Mind Body Dualism Philosophy of mind

In the philosophy of mind, mind-body dualism denotes either the view that mental phenomena are non-physical or that the mind and body are distinct and separable. Mind and body dualism represents the metaphysical stance that mind and body are two distinct substances, each with a different essential nature. Originated in the ancient period, a well known version of dualism is credited to René Descartes of the 17th century.

Aristotle shared Plato's view of multiple souls and further elaborated a hierarchical arrangement, corresponding to the distinctive functions of plants, animals and



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humans, a nutritive soul of growth and metabolism that all three share, a perceptive soul of pain, pleasure and desire that only humans and other animals share, and the faculty of reason that is unique to humans only. For Plato, however, the soul was not dependent on the physical body, he believed in the migration of the soul to a new physical body. It has been considered a form of reductionism by some philosophers, since it enables the tendency to ignore very big groups of variables by its assumed associations with the mind or the body, and not for its real value when it comes to explaining or reducing a studied phenomenon.

Dualism is closely associated with the thought of Rene Descartes (1641), which holds that the mind is a non-physical and therefore, non-spatial substance. Descartes clearly identified the mind with consciousness and self awareness and distinguished this from the brain as the seat of intelligence. Hence,

he was the first documented western philosopher to formulate the mind-body problem in the form in which it exists today. Dualism is contrasted with various kinds of monism. Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent materialism or non-reductive physicalism in some sense.

* Mind Body Identity Theory - J.J.C Smart

J.J.C Smart was a British Australian philosopher who made significant contributions to the disciplines of metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and political philosophy. He is a proponent of the identity hypothesis of the mind and brain, which maintains that the states and processes of the mind are identical to those of the brain. The properties of the mind are the same as the properties of the brain. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate why cartesian dualism cannot

be correct and to argue in favour of the identity theory of mind. According to him, there is no philosophical argument that may support the existence of dualities, smart probes some possibilities in order to perhaps explain what it is that we describe when we report a sensation or an after picture.

Smart is against behaviourism because in his view, when a person reports having an after image or that they are in pain, they are doing more than simply substituting a verbal experience for other types of pain behaviour. Instead, they may be reporting something, even if that something is not particularly mysterious because it is an agitation condition and therefore open to behaviouristic analysis. A distinct suggestion is the one that he expresses a desire to steer clear of if at all possible. This suggestion states that the report that I am experiencing pain is authentic, and that the item that it reports is an image.



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ducible psychological something.

After arguing against behaviourism and dualism, Samual go on to support the notion that sensations are merely one category of brain function. According to his point of view, reports about sensations are simply reports about brain processes, hence, statements about sensations cannot be transformed into statements about brain processes. He thinks that this is merely a coincidence. In order to elaborate on his claim that feelings are nothing beyond the processes that occur in the brain, he provided the illustration of a notion as an example. He said that a notion is nothing beyond what it is.

* Criticism

① Sensations are not brain processes. The correlationism between sensation and brain processes is only contingent. So sensations cannot be identical to brain processes.

(i) Even if sensations are a particular kind of mental event and brain processes, the properties of those sensations are still irreducibly psychological. So we are still left with a ~~realism~~ realm of irreducibly psychological ~~and~~ items as the dualist claims.

(ii) Brain processes can be swift or slow, but sensations cannot be so, sensations are not brain processes.

(iii) It can imagine having sensations but not brain process. So, sensations are not brain processes.

According to the conclusion drawn by Smart, the idea that sensations are only brain processes can be considered an empirical claim in some contexts, while in other contexts it cannot. In the dispute between some sort of materialism and epiphenomenalism then it is not an empirical issue, but if it is read as stating that feelings are not liver, heart, or kidney processes, then it is the former. Putnam argues that mental properties are not identical

Physical properties because the same mental property can be related to different physical properties.

* category mistake - Ryle

The term "category mistake" was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his book "The Concept of Mind" (1949) to remove what he argued to be a confusion over the nature of mind born from cartesian metaphysics. Ryle argued that it was a mistake to treat the mind as an object made of an immaterial substance because predications of substance are not meaningful for a collection of dispositions and capacities. A category mistake or category error is a semantic or ontological error in which things belonging to a particular category are presented as if they belong to a different category or alternatively a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property.

Ryle gives examples of different category mistakes. A visitor who sees plenty of colleges, laboratories and libraries in



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Oxford but asks 'But where is the university?'
A child watches a military parade and after
seeing the marching squadrons and batta-
lions asks 'But where is the division?'
Someone asks who in a cricket team is
responsible for team-spirit.

Ryle claims to identify the specific
mistakes happening here: there illustrations
of category mistakes have a common fea-
ture which must be noticed. The mistakes
were made by people who did not know
how to wield the concepts 'university',
'division' and 'team-spirit'. Their puzzles arose
from inability to use certain items in the
English vocabulary. The theoretically inter-
esting category-mistakes are those made
by people who are perfectly competent to
apply concepts, at least in the situations
with which they are familiar, but are still
unable in their abstract thinking to allocate
those concepts to logical types to which
they do not belong.



A significant question arising from the discipline of philosophy concerns the nature of the mind. What constitutes the mind and whether the mind is something ontologically distinct from either brain or behaviour and inquires of an ongoing debate. Gilbert Ryle challenged substance dualism - by claiming that dualism - what he refers to as the dogma of the 'ghost in the machine' - commits a 'category mistake'. The purpose of this essay is to show that Ryle's argument against dualism is not fatal to dualism.

Ryle's aim in his essay is to prove that the official doctrine Cartesian dualism is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. This is because it commits, he claims, a category mistake, by representing the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another. To explain what he means by a category mistake, Ryle gives a series of illustrations of placing an item in the wrong logical category.



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However, Ryle's accusation is sustainable only by first declaring victory to the antidualist. certainly, Ryle offers supporting arguments in the rest of ~~the~~ his literature. However, his attempt to cut dualism off at the pass simply pushes the question back into the realm of the original debate, and the category mistake ~~not~~ simply begs the question. Thus, if the present reconstruction of Ryle's argument is accurate, it appears that his challenge against dualism is not ultimately fatal to dualism. If dualism is to be proven untenable, it must be by other means.



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with the compromise solution
the compromise solution is a feasible solution,
which is the closest to the ideal and means
an argument established by mutual concessions.
A compromise solution to a problem with
different criteria can help the decision
makers to reach a final decision.

A compromise is to make a deal bet-
ween different parties where each party
gives up part of their demand. In organ-
arguments, compromise is a concept of finding
agreement through communication, through a
mutual acceptance of terms - often involving va-
riations from an original goal or desire. Reje-
cting and finding the best possible compromise
is an important problem in fields like game theory
and the voting system.

Research has indicated that suboptimal
compromises are often the result of negotia-
tions failing to realise when they have interest
that are completely compatible with those of
the other. and settle for suboptimal
agreements. mutually better outcomes can often
be founded by careful investigation of both parties
interests especially if done easily in negotiations.



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-the compromise solutions of a multi-criteria decision making or multi-criteria decision analysis problem that is the closest to the best could be determined by the vikor method (method developed for multi-criteria optimization of complex system) which provides a maximum utility of the majority, and a minimum individual regret of the opponent.

* Hard Problem (David Chalmers)

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why and how humans have qualia (phenomenal experience). This is in contrast to the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that give us and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, and so forth. These problems are seen as relatively easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify the mechanism that perform such functions. Philosopher David Chalmers writes that even once we have solved all such problems about the brain and experience, the hard problem will still persist.

The hard problem contrasts with so-called easy problem, such as explaining how the brain

integrates information, categories and discriminates environmental stimuli, or focusses attention. Such phenomena are function really definable. That is roughly put, they are definable in terms of what they allow a subject to do. So, for eg, if mechanisms that explain how the brain integrates information are discovered, then the first of the easy problems listed would be solved. The same point applies to all other easy problems, they concern specifying mechanisms that explain how functions are performed. For the easy problem, once the relevant mechanisms are well understood, there is little or no explanatory work left to do. Experience does not seem to fit this explanatory model. Although experience is associated with a variety of functions, explaining how these functions are performed would still seem to leave important question unanswered. We would still want to know why there performance is accompanied by experience, and why this is that kind of experience rather than another kind. So, for eg, even when we find something that plays the causal role to pain,



eg. something that is caused by ~~various~~ neural stimulation and that causes recall and avoidance. we can still ask why the particular experiences of hunting is opposed to, say, if is associated with that robe, such problems are hard problems.

Cognitive models of consciousness are sometimes described as potential solutions to the hard problem. However, it is unclear that any such model could achieve the goal. For eg - consider global workspace theory, according to which the contents of consciousness are globally available. For various cognitive processes such as attention, memory and verbal report. Even if this theory is correct, the connection between such processes and experience - eg - why they are accompanied by experience at all might well remain opaque. For similar reasons, discovering neural correlates of consciousness might leave the hard problem unsolved. The question as to why those correlations exist would remain unanswered. Nevertheless, scientific advances on cognitive models and ~~new~~ neural correlates of consciousness might well play important role in a comprehensive solution.

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In the hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining the relation between physical phenomena, such as brain processes and experience i.e., phenomenal consciousness or mental states / events with phenomenal qualities or qualia.

* Third Person Account

Q. Discuss critically the third person account of consciousness.

Ans In third person point of view, the action is narrating a story about the characters, referring to them by name or using the third-person pronouns 'he', 'she', and 'they'. The other points of view in writing are first person and second person. Here, I, me, my, mine, myself, we, our, ours, ourselves are first person, and she, he, him, herself, he, him, his, himself, they, them, themselves, their, theirs are third person.

For example, the point of view of a story determined who is telling it and the narrator's relationship to the characters in the story. In first person point of view the narrator is a character in the story. Nothing is from their perspective. On third person point of view, the narrator is not part of the story and the characters never acknowledge the narrator's



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presence less common than first and third is second person point of view. In second person point of view the reader is part of the story. The narrator describes the reader's actions, thoughts and background using 'you'.

In third person narration, the narrator exists outside the events of the story, and relates the actions of the characters by referring to their names or by the third-person pronouns he, she, or they. The third person account looks at consciousness as it exists in objects. It explains mental properties in objective terms, and show how they determine behaviours. This is the domain of philosophy of mind.

* Third Person Account - Behaviour Behaviourism, which is a typical 3rd person account, is such as an attempt to solve the problem of other minds. According to it, "x is in pain, does not attribute a peculiar state to x rather it maintains that x behaves in a particular kind of way. x does not have a mental state i.e. private to x. Now if pain means simply pain behaviour, there is no problem of doubting whether x is in pain or not as behaviour is something public. So, the Problem of Privacy is immediately solved.



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But though behaviourism is plausible in third person cases, yet there are difficulties in the first person cases. Suppose we try to retain the truth of both the theories and bring about a compromise i.e. support third person mental state statements may be exhausted in terms of behaviour, and in first person cases on self-knowledge, I have a distinct feeling or sensation going on. But even such a compromise would be unsatisfactory for it reduces the third person to automata, and the only person I really know is my self. It would suggest that my pain is something different from another's pain. But what a concept means in first person instances must mean exactly the same in third person instances.

Wittgenstein shows that the solipsist thesis of the carticians as well as behaviourism are both only particularly true. He maintains that the carticians make a mistake in regarding the relation between the mental states and bodily behaviour as contingent. This contingent relation leads to the consequence that -

- ① It would be possible for me to have all



mental states that I have now even if I don't have a body at all. &

⑧ Another ~~consequence~~ consequence is that the essence of the mental state is private and internal. we can learn their meaning only by a private experience of them.

wittgenstein maintains that if such a contingent relation between the mental states and their bodily expression ~~leads~~ does in fact hold it should be possible to have a language which is in-intelligible only to the person who speaks it.

wittgenstein also refutes the suggestion made by the carticians that what we mean by for example 'pain' is something that we know solely from our own case by reference to a private sensation. He uses the analogy of the beetle in the box to bring out his point. Suppose every one has a box with something in it, such that no one can look any ~~one~~ one else's box. ~~we~~ ^{with} call what is in box a beetle and every one says that he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his box. we point out that it would be possible

for what is in each man box to be different,
and even for there to be nothing, and yet
for the word bittle to have a use.

Through the Private language
argument and the analogy of the bittle-
in the box, we successfully show that the
concept of a private object requires
public criteria i.e. inter-subjective ~~time~~
agreement on the condition under which
the concept gets its use.

Thus Wittgenstein successfully
shows that if a publicly determinative sense
is given to words connected to private
experiences, then there is no obstacle to
the possibility of having knowledge of
other people's states of mind. The success
of Wittgenstein's argument overcomes the di-
fficulties of privacy and rules out ex-
ceptionalism of other mind.

P.F. Strawson like Wittgenstein, is
convinced that privacy is an empty and
pointless concept. 'In individuals' he points
out that mental states are not private.
From the fact that something cannot be
shared, it need not follow that it is



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private. Just as you cannot have my feeling
so it is equally true that you cannot
sleep on smile my smile. so this criterion of
sharing need not logically imply privacy
as the ~~anti~~ critics insisted.

* FIRST PERSON ACCOUNT - According to the
notion of privacy our states of mind are
necessarily private to us in the sense that
our states belong to us and no one else
can have them. unlike a number of other
things that are private to me for eg -
my private property, other people
could come to have things that are
now my private property. But that is
a sense in which states of mind are mine
in such a way that they could be owned
by others. others may have their mental
states, but it is a logical impossibility
that any one else should have my pains
for they could not feel my pain. To put the
matter strongly, I could not have or feel
another person's experiences unless I
could become the other person. But this
is absurd.



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It may be pointed out that two persons may perceive the same object, hear the same sound and feel the same feeling, and from this it may be concluded that they have same experiences. But it may be ~~also~~ answered that though this is true, they do not sense the same sense-data. The sense data may be qualitatively similar, but they cannot be numerically.

If this is the case, then the wish to know with absolute certainty the thoughts and feelings of others is to demand a logical impossibility. To know others mental state implies that and have them which I cannot unless and become the other person.

This scepticism of our knowledge of others minds follows if he accepts the following propositions -

- (i) I cannot have direct knowledge of anyone else experiences.
- (ii) when I say I have a headache, my statement is not equivalent to any statement about my event behaviour.
- (iii) consequently the only ground that I can have for believing that others

People have experiences is that their behaviour is similar to mine.

Philosophers like the carticians accept all the above proposition they find that analogy is the argument which solves the problem of other minds. However it has been pointed out by the critics that the argument from analogy cannot be legitimately applied to minds. They hold that such an argument can be valid only if it is possible to have an independent check on the conclusion. But in the case of mind it is impossible to check the feelings of pain others independent of his behaviour. Another difficulty is that the conclusion of an analogical argument is by its very nature always probable. Hence, by analogy I can never know for certain others mental states.

It consequently follows that the wish to know the thoughts and feelings of other is impossible. I have to depend on others to tell me their mental states.

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But it may be the case that the other person declines me. we are thus landed with solipsism that is the view that everything I am aware of is private to me, so that I am locked up in my own experiences and have no way of getting through them to another mind. This is the typical first person account.

But this consequence of privacy seems difficult to accept. From the undoubted fact that one sometimes does not know what other people are thinking or feeling, it need not follow that one can never know. In order to know what goes on in another's mind one must ultimately share his experiences.

* Distinguish between first and third person Account :- If we were to survey the various theories about consciousness that have been proposed in the twenty five hundred years of known work, we would find that they fall into two general patterns. There is what we shall call the first person account which results from attending to how things are in one's own case. And there is



the third - Person account, which results from attending to how things are when someone else is conscious in some way.

Behaviourism is a typical third-person account since it proposes that we define all expressions involving consciousness in terms of bodily behaviour which can be observed in others as easily as in oneself.

A typical behavioristic device for dealing with the fact that a person in a particular mental state may not be behaving in any particular way is to introduce the concept of a disposition of behave. Disposition are properties of things such that under certain circumstances the thing that has the dispositional property will undergo a certain change, for ex - brittleness is a dispositional property, a thing is brittle if, and only if under suitable circumstances it will shatter.

To find cases that offer difficulty to the third person account

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we must look for those cases in which the essence lies in what happens inwardly. let us turn to those cases in which it appears that an essential feature of the case is the ~~inner~~ occurrence of something, as we say "going on beyond the person's mind" or "occupying his consciousness". The most plausible candidates are sensations mental images and thoughts.

So far we have sought to define consciousness in third person terms, in terms of what we can observe of others. We have treated consciousness as if it were simply a public and objective phenomenon. And this has forced us to restrict ourselves in our understanding and dispositions to behave. If a person feels pain, only he can know how that feeling others may feel their own pain, but they cannot feel his. What is needed here is a distinction between my pain and another person's pain. The first person account does not allow for such a distinction. The first person account allow distinctions between

different sorts of sensations and between past, present and future sensation, but it does not allow a distinction between sensations that are mine and that are another's.

To summarize so far, neither of the two accounts we examined gives an adequate account of consciousness, and yet brings out an important fact. The obvious solution is to try to see what is true and correct in each of the accounts, noticing that it is essential to the nature of consciousness that there be both a first person and a third person aspect.



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Unit - III Problem of other mind

* Analogical Inference - The Problem of other minds, in philosophy, the problem of Justifying the commonsensical belief that others besides oneself possess minds and are capable of thinking or feeling somewhat as one does oneself.

The traditional philosophical Justification for belief in other minds is the argument from analogy, which as cogently stated by John Stuart Mill, he argues that, because one's body and outward behaviour are observably similar to the bodies and behaviours of others, one is justified by analogy in believing that others have feelings like one's own and not simply the bodies and behaviour of automata.

This argument has been repeatedly attacked since the 1940s, although some philosophers continue to defend certain forms of it. Norman Malcolm an American disciple of Wittgenstein, asserted that the argument is either superfluous or its conclusion is unintelligible to the person who would make it, because, in order to know what the conclusion that human figure has thought and feelings means, one would have to know what criteria are involved in correctly or in incorrectly stating that someone has thoughts as feeling - and knowledge of these criteria would render the argument from analogy unnecessary depends of the argument have maintained, however, since both the person making the argument and others describe inner feelings in similar



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ways and understand each other, reference to a common language justified the argument from analogy better than does observation of similarities of bodies and outward behaviour.

The argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the ~~ex~~ skeptic. The inference from observed behaviour to the existence of feelings, sensations etc, in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behaviour and feelings, sensations and so on, to be naturally correlated but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.

According to the analogical thinker that relies upon an analogy. An analogical argument is an explicit representation of a form of analogical reasoning that accepted similarities between two systems to support the conclusion that some further similarity exist.

Another objection to the argument is that it seems to assume that one infers from what it is to have feelings simply by introspection. This assumption has been objected to by followers of Wittgenstein, who think that it leads to the possibility of a 'private language'.



to describe one's own sensations, a possibility that Wittgenstein rejected on main ground. Such philosophers maintain that one simply does not know what one's own feelings are in a way appropriate to the argument until others know to describe such feelings in appropriate language. Some philosophers have thought, however, that this situation leads to the conclusion that one can be wrong when one says, 'my tooth aches' in the same way that one can be mistaken when one says "John's tooth aches". This thesis is unacceptable to many who hold that since first person present statements about sensation cannot be false - i.e. they are unchangeable, discussion of such problems tends to lead quickly into difficulties of providing an adequate analysis of statements about one's own sensations.

* epistemological approach to address the problem of other mind - It has been suggested that an alternative to the view that mind ~~has~~ lies behind and serves as the cause of behaviour is the view that behaviour serves as ~~of mind~~ the criterion of mind. The former conception of mind in relation to behaviour is associated with the following ideas -



① my mind is private to me ② I am both infallible and incorrigible with respect to my own mental states, and ③ I can know my own mental state without having to observe anything about my body. This picture of mind is bolstered by the thought that, whatever another person says or does, it is always possible that they are deceiving me about what is going on in their minds - an extreme version of which leads to the thought that I am entirely deceived and all others are mere automata or zombies. In short, this conception of mind leads to the traditional epistemological problem of other minds. Standard response to this problem arguments from analogy and best explanation draw a parallel between knowledge and another mind and explanation in science. In this connection Wittgenstein writes, 'misleading parallel, Psychology treats of processes in the Physics'. In the blue book, with contrasts the business of citing criteria of that of giving of symptoms with the making of hypotheses, he associates the citing of criteria with "the grammar" of a word or linguistic convention.

Q. Discuss Wittgenstein's Private Language argument.
How does it relate to the Problem of other mind?

Ans. The Private Language game argues that a language is understandable by only a single individual is incoherent. A language which references one's inner thoughts, feelings or experiences but which cannot be used for communication, since it is known to and understandable by only one person - the existence of which was famously argued by Wittgenstein to be impossible.

The idea of a private language was made famous in Philosophy by Wittgenstein. The word of this language one to refer to what only the speaker can know - to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. This is not intended to cover, cases of recording one's experiences in a personal code, for such a code, however obscure in fact could in principle be deciphered. What Wittgenstein had in mind in a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originals because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others.

Immediately after introducing the idea, Wittgenstein goes on to argue that there cannot be such a language. The importance of drawing



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Philosophers attention to a largely unheeded of
notion and then arguing that it is unrealizable
lies in the fact that an unformulated reference
is arguably essential to mainstream epistemo-
logy philosophy of mind and metaphysics from
Descartes to versions of the representational
theory of mind which became prominent
in late twentieth century cognitive science.

In addition to establishing the possi-
bility of knowing others mind from the back-
ground of Wittgenstein's private language ar-
gument on the refutation of solipsism and
skepticism, this discourse highlights the
impacts of such knowledge in interpersonal
relationship. In other words, is the light of
Wittgenstein's conception of language as an all-
embracing feature of man's existence, it exa-
mines the extent to which the knowledge
of other minds can advance man's social
intercourse. Thus, a rational investigation
into the possibility of knowing other mind,
the extent or degree of such knowledge,
and the establishment of its usefulness con-
stitute the basic concerns of this philoso-
phical enquiry.



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I discuss elaborately John lock's persons and Personal Identity.

Ans If a Person persists through time, what is present of a Person at different time is not a part of it, but rather the Person himself in his wholeness are entirely. This way of persisting whereby something persists by being wholly present at different times, is called endurance. Personal persistence is called personal continuity and self continuity is the uninterrupted connection concerning a particular Person of their private life and personality. Thus it is memory criterion take for a Person to persist from one time to another. It is also patience and constant effort that take for a Person to persist from one time to another.

The Persistence question is often taken to ask what it takes for the same Person to exist at two different times. The most common formulation is something like that - if a Person x exist at one time and a Person y exists at another time, under what possible is it the case that x is y ? But what it takes for us to persist might depend on whether

we are biological organisms which we cannot know a priori if there could be immaterial people, such as gods or angels, what it takes for them to persist might differ from what it takes for a human person to persist.

The persistence question what does it take for a person to persist from one time to another? Four main sorts of answers to the persistence question have been proposed. The most popular are Psychological - continuity views. They say that our persistence consists in some Psychological relation. You are that future being that in some sense inherits its mental features from you - beliefs, memories, preferences, the capacity for rational thought and you are that past being whose mental features you have inherited in this way.

The second answer is that our persistence consists in some sort of brute physical relation? You are that past or future being that has your body, or that is the same biological organism as you are, or the like. It has nothing to do with Psychological facts.

Some try to combine those views, saying that we need both mental and physical continuity to survive, or that with would suffice without the other. A different sort of proposal, narrativism is that what it takes for us to persist has to do



with the stories we tell about ourselves. we understand our lives in terms of narratives about the momentous events in our past and their influence on our later decision and character.

All these views agree that there is something that it takes for us to persist - that there are informative, non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for a person existing at one time to exist at another time. A fourth view, anti-criterialism, denies this. Psychological and physical continuity are evidence for persistence, it says, but do not always guarantee it and may not be required.

Personal identity and persistence deals with philosophical questions that arises about ourselves by virtue of our being people. This contrasts with questions about ourselves that arises by virtue of our being living things, conscious beings, material objects, or persistence over time, or the like. many of these questions occur to namely all of us now and again.

Q. What does it take for a person to persist from one time to another? Discuss in the light of the issue of personal identity.

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There are two components which explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. Firstly, his particular moral and legal conception of a person, and secondly his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability and just reward and punishment.

Given one accepts Locke's conception of a person and his understanding of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also sufficient.

Locke's account of persons and personal identity within Locke's epistemological, metaphysical and religious view. At least from the divine perspective, the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and that it is a verbal question whether Locke's term consciousness refers not only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying ontological constitution.



Personhood and Personal Identity

The term Personhood refers to the state or condition of being an individual person, the essential meaning and constituent properties of what it is to be a person. Personhood includes abilities such as the capacities for understanding, reasoning, learning, abstract thought from past experiences, planning, communication and problem solving.

Memory and Body Criteria

In order to gain a body memory according to the theory, one simply needs to go through a traumatic experience and the body may store this memory in any place in the body that participated in the event, such as arm, if it got hurt.

Memory is the power or process of remembering or recalling what has been learned and retained especially through associative mechanism began to lose his memory as he grew older. A person's identity only reaches as far as their memory extends into the past. In other words, who one is critically depends upon what one remembers. Thus, as a person's memory begins to disappear, so does his body identity.

Body criteria consists in memory. Sameness of episodic memory is metaphysically necessary and sufficient for sameness of persons. John Locke holds that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. He considered personal identity to be founded on consciousness or memory and not on the substance of either the soul or the body. According to the body view, an individual is identified in terms of his or her physical body. According to the personality view, an individual is identified by his or her unique set of beliefs, desires, memories, goals and so on.

But Locke's memory theory was too weak in that simply remembering an experience is not enough to make you that person who had that experience. However, our body is not as reliable as it seems if we consider all the biological changes a single human body goes through every second. Physical changes happen constantly, yet they are not visible in a short time. Day by day one looks and feels like the same person, but the change reveals on itself over a year.



Unit - V
Jung - collective unconscious, Archetypes, Persona

Q. Discuss Carl Jung's view on collective unconsciousness and archetypes.

Ans collective unconscious, term introduced by Psychiatrist Carl Jung to represent a form of the unconscious, that part of the mind containing memories and impulses of which the individual is not aware, common to mankind as a whole and originating in the inherited structure of the brain. It is distinct from the personal unconscious, which arises from the experience of the individual. According to Jung, the collective unconscious contains archetypes, or universal primordial images and ideas.

Carl Jung founded the school of analytical psychology. He is responsible for proposing and developing the psychological concepts of the collective unconscious along with introverted and extraverted personalities.

Jung worked with Sigmund Freud, another prominent psychologist during that time. In early studies, Jung's work affirmed many of Freud's ideas. But as time went on the two eventually in their Principles of Psychology -

including their thoughts about the development of the unconscious mind.

The biggest difference between their explanation of the unconscious mind is that Freud believed that it was the product of personal experiences, while Jung believed that the unconscious was inherited from the past collective experience of humanity. According to Jung, the collective unconscious is made of a collective of knowledge and imagery that every person is born with and is shared by all human beings due to ancestral experience. Though humans may not know what thoughts and images are in their collective unconscious, it is thought that in moments of crisis, the psyche can tap into it.

Jung believed that the collective unconscious is expressed through universal archetypes. Archetypes are signs, symbols or patterns of thinking and or behaving that one inherits from our ancestors. According to Jung, these mythological images or cultural symbols are not static or fixed. Instead, many

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different archetypes may overlap or combine at any given time. Some common archetypes that Jung proposed for explaining the unconscious mind include

* Persona — the mask we use to conceal our inner selves to the outside world. Jung saw the personal unconscious as ~~comprised~~ comprising all the acquisitions of personal life, everything forgotten, repressed, subliminally perceived thought, felt. The development of a social persona is a vital part of adapting to and preparing for adult life in the external social world. A strong ego relates to the outside world through a flexible persona, identifications with a specific persona, like doctor, scholar etc inhibits psychological development.

Thus, archetypes are typical modes of apprehension and whatever we meet with uniformly and regularly meaning modes of apprehension we are dealing with an archetype no matter whether its mythological character is recognised or not.

unit - V

Freud Philosophy of mind

Freud divided human consciousness into three levels of awareness, the conscious, preconscious and unconscious. Each of these levels corresponds to and overlaps with Freud's ideas of the id, ego and superego. Freud divided the mind into the conscious mind (or the ego) and the unconscious mind. The latter was then further divided into the id (or instincts and drive) and the superego (or conscience). In this theory, the unconscious refers to the mental processes of which individuals make themselves unaware.

Freudian theory postulates that adult personality is made up of three aspects they are

- (i) The id, operating on the Pleasure Principle generally within the unconscious.
- (ii) The ego, operating on the reality Principle within the conscious realm, and
- (iii) The superego, operating on the morality Principle at all levels of consciousness.

* The id - The id is the primitive and instinctive component of personality. The id is a part of the unconscious that contains all the urges and impulses, including what is called the libido.

a kind of generalised sexual energy that is used for everything from survival instincts to appreciation of art. The id is also kind of stubborn, for it responds only to what Freud called the pleasure principle and nothing else. The personality of the newborn child is all id and only later does it develop an ego and super ego. But the id remains ~~inf~~ infantile in its function throughout a person's life and does not change with time or experience, as it is not in touch with the external world.

* The ego - The ego is the that part of id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world. The ego is the only part of the conscious philosophical personality. It's what the person is aware of when they think about themselves, and it's what they usually try to project toward others.

The ego develops to mediate between the unrealistic id and the external real world. It is the decision making component of personality. Ideally, the ego works

by reason, whereas the id is chaotic and unreasonable.

* The super ego - The super ego is the part of the unconscious that is the voice of conscience and the source of self criticism. The super ego's function is to control the id's impulses, especially those which society forbids, such as sex and aggression.

The super ego consists of two systems.

The conscience and the ideal self. The conscience is the 'inner voice' that tells us when we have done something wrong. The conscience can punish the ego through causing feelings of guilt.

The ideal self is an imaginary picture of how we ought to be and represents career aspirations, how to treat other people, and how to behave as a member of society.

Thus according to Freud's psychoanalytic theory, the id is the primitive and instinctual part of the mind that contains sexual and aggressive drives and hidden memories, the super ego operates as a moral conscience, and the ego is the realistic part that mediates between the desires of the id and the super-ego.

Freud's notion of the unconscious

Freud - the unconscious as a repository of socially unacceptable ideas, wishes or desires, traumatic memories, and painful emotions, and ~~partly~~ put out of mind by the mechanism of psychological repression. He believed that the unconscious continues to influence behaviour even though people are unaware of these underlying influences.

When conceptualising the unconscious mind, it can be helpful to compare the mind to an iceberg. Everything above the water represents conscious awareness while everything below the water represents the unconscious.

Freud believed that many of our feelings, desires and emotions are repressed or held out of awareness because they are simply too threatening. Freud believed that sometimes these hidden desires and wishes make themselves known through dreams and slips of the tongue.

Freud didn't exactly invent the idea of the conscious versus unconscious mind, but he was certainly responsible for making

It popular and this was one of his main contributions to Psychology.

Thus, according to Freud the unconscious mind is the primary source of human behaviour. Like our feelings, motives and decisions are actually powerfully influenced by our past experiences, and stored in the unconscious. He applied these three systems to his structure of the personality or psyche the id, ego and superego. While we are fully aware of what is going on in the conscious mind, we have no idea of what information is stored in the unconscious mind. The unconscious contains all sorts of significant and disturbing material which we need to keep out of awareness because they are too threatening to acknowledge fully.



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