

PHPDSC252
CLASSICAL TEXT (INDIAN)
(TARKASAMGRAHA)

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UNIT-I

Prama, and Aprama : Definition
Samsaya, Viparyaya, and Tarka
Pramana : Definition

1. What is Prama?

Ans: Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge is called *pramā* and invalid knowledge is called *apramā*. The Nyāya School advocates that valid knowledge is the true and right apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object as it is. The characterization of valid knowledge is a consequence of the correspondence theory of truth which states that truth is the correspondence between a proposition and reality. Thus, valid knowledge is treated as presentative knowledge. Presentative knowledge arises when the object of knowledge is directly present to the knower. For example, Dr. Biplab perceives a pen in his shirt pocket is an instance of presentative knowledge. Valid knowledge is produced by the four valid sources of knowledge perception, inference comparison, and *sabda*.

2. What is Aprama?

Ans: Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge is called *pramā* and invalid knowledge is called *apramā*. Invalid knowledge is defined as the wrong apprehension of object. It includes memory (*smṛuti*), doubt (*samsaya*), error (*viparyāya*), and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*). Memory is not presentative but representative knowledge. Memory can also consider as a source of valid knowledge provided what is recalled or remembered were experienced in the past as a presentative cognition. Doubt is lack of certainty on cognition. Error is misapprehension of what is cognized. For example, a snake is mistakenly cognized as rope. *Tarka* is considered as invalid knowledge because it does not produce any new knowledge. It only confirms what one already knows earlier. Thus, it is representative in nature.

3. What do you mean by Samsaya?

Ans: Doubt (*saṃśaya*) is a form of invalid knowledge. It is an indefinite cognition (*anavadhāraṇātma* *pratyakṣa*) which characterizes an object in mutually conflicting ways. The

recognition, in a thing possessing a certain quality, of many contradictory qualities as characterizing it, is called doubt (*saṁśaya*). When in one and the same object there arises the apprehension of two or more conflicting notions, that becomes doubt. It is of three kinds.

(1) The first kind is that which is caused by the observation of certain common attributes of two things while not noticing any differentiating features between the two, e.g., whether the object ahead is a tree stump or a person. In this case on seeing an object at a distance the observer does not notice any curvedness or crevices that would enable the object being recognized as a tree stump; nor does he see any clear definition of head, hands, etc. which would enable the object being recognized as a person. At the same time the person observes some features common to both the stump and a person such as tallness, shortness, etc. Then he perceives a doubt in the form, 'Is this a stump or a person?'

(2) The second kind of doubt is that which arises from the difference of opinion about one and the same thing when there is no special reason to ignore or accept either. For example, when one says that sound is eternal and another says that it is not the hearer who sees no special grounds either way, doubts whether sound is eternal or not.

(3) The third kind of doubt is that which is caused by observing some peculiar characteristics without anything special in an object. For example, when one apprehends smell which is the special quality of earth, but which does not indicate whether it subsists in eternal or non-eternal things and when he does not see any special reason then the doubt arises whether earth is eternal or not.

Gautama defines *saṁśaya* as a conflicting judgement on the precise character of an object.^[8] According to Vātsyāyana, doubt is of five kinds. The first form of doubt is called contradictory knowledge or *vimarśa*, about the same object due to the apprehension of common characteristics (*samānadharmā*) and which depends on the remembrance of the special characteristics of each of them (*viśeṣāpekṣa*). Secondly, doubt may arise from the cognition of a peculiar and unique property of many objects (*anekadharmā*). Thirdly, doubt is due to the contradictory statements about the same object (*vipratipatti*). Fourthly, it may be caused due to irregularity of perception (*upalabdhyavyavasthā*). Lastly, doubt may also be caused due to the irregularity of non-apprehension or non-perception (*anupalabdhyavyavasthā*). For example, we do not perceive water in the radish where it really exists and also on dry land where it does not exist.

According to the Naiyāyikas, doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false one. It is not a valid knowledge because it lacks belief or firmness which is an essential mark of validity. The Sāṃkhya system excludes doubt from valid knowledge. They hold it as an uncertain knowledge. The validity of doubt as a form of knowledge is not acceptable on the ground that doubt, not being a definite and positive knowledge, cannot be tested by correspondence.

Doubt is not an error. In it, mind oscillates between different ideas with the result that it does not carry with it the definite assertion of any character with regard to its object. Doubt neither asserts anything nor denies it positively. It is not a judgement, but a questioning attitude of the mind making no claim to truth. It is the mental reference of two or more contradictory properties to the same object. In it, mind keeps moving between different alternate characterizations of some given object.

4. What do you mean by Tarka?

Ans: Hypothetical argument is an intellectual act which contributes to the ascertainment of truth by means of adducing logical grounds in favour of one of the alternative possibilities when the reality is not known in its actual character. *Tarka* is a distinct type of reasoning. It consists in arguing that if out of two concomitant things, the concomitant (*vyāpya*) one is present, the presence of the other its correlate (*vyāpaka*) should also be present. For example, if a jar were to exist here it should be perceivable like the spot (where it stands). This kind of hypothetical reasoning helps the instruments of valid cognition in this way. Suppose, someone concludes that there is no fire in the hill after doubting about its existence. Then if another were to tell him, 'if there is no fire in the hill, there would be no smoke also'. This kind of argument is called *tarka*. It helps in establishing the presence of the probandum in the subject which is the object of inference (*anumāna*).^[16] According to Vātsyāyana, when two contradictory alternatives seem to be equally possible with regard to a particular point of enquiry and the mind oscillates between them, hypothetical argument in support of either of them helps to resolve the indecisiveness. He opines that, it is not *pramāṇa* but simply an aid to *pramāṇa*.^[17] Vācaspati Miśra agrees with Vātsyāyana and *Uddyotakara*, but lays greater stress upon the aspect of elimination, which happens to be his valuable contribution to hypothetical reasoning. In his view, the method of elimination helps to prove that one of the alternatives is logically impossible and the remaining one is nearer to truth.

5. What is Viparyaya?

Ans: Illusion or error is a form of invalid knowledge like memory and doubt. It is contrasted from truth and it is a new experience of some present object. It is invalid because it reveals a present object in the form of a different object. It misrepresents a fact. When an object is presented in a form which does not belong to it, then it is a case of illusion or error. Different systems of Indian philosophy have come out with divergent theories to explain the causes of illusion. These different theories are known as *khyātivādas*. Illusion is an undoubted knowledge, which indeed does not agree with the true nature of the object. The word *khyāti* means knowledge and hence the this regard it may be stated that knowledge may be accepted as both true and false.

Therefore, the khyātivādas are discussed only in the case of falsity of knowledge.

There are five theories of illusion or error. These are—

1. *ātmakhyāti*;
2. *asatkhyāti*;
3. *akhyāti*;
4. *anyathākhyāti* and
5. *anirvacanīyakhyāti*.

6. What is Pramana? What are the different kinds of Pramana?

Ans: The Nyāya school of thought is adhered to atomistic pluralism and logical realism. It is atomistic pluralism on the account that atom is the constituent of matter and there are not one but many entities, both material and spiritual, as ultimate constituents of the universe. By holding pluralism standpoint it refutes materialistic and spiritualistic monism. It is a system of logical realism by dint of its adaptation the doctrine that the world exists independently from our perceptions and knowledge. Further, the independent existence of the world can be defended not by our faith or intuition but by the logical arguments and critical reflection on the nature of experience. The Nyāya philosophy recognizes sixteen categories and the first category is known as ‘*pramāna*’ which focuses the logical and epistemological character of the Nyāya system. It professes that there are four independent *pramānas* (sources of valid knowledge). These are; perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony or *sabda*.

UNIT-II

Pratyaksa : Definition

Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Stages of Pratyaksa

Classification of Pratyaksa

1. What is Pratyaksa?

Ans: According to Nyāyikas, perception is the direct and immediate cognition produced by the interaction between the object and sense-organs. For a perceptual cognition, four elements are necessary. These are; the self, mind, sense organs and objects. The self is in contact with the mind (*manas*), the mind is in contact with the sense organs and lastly, the sense organs are in contact with the objects, as a result, we perceive objects. There are two types of perception; ordinary perception (*laukika*) and extraordinary perception (*alukika*). Ordinary perception is further divided in two sorts; external (*bāhya*) and internal (*mānas*). External Perception has five distinctions

because it is connected with five sense organs - auditory, visual, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory. In case of internal perception, the contacts occur between mind and the object. As a result, knowledge produces. Examples of internal perceptions are; feeling, desiring, wishing, etc. Again, perceptions are divided in three sorts. These are, indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa), determinate perception (savikalpa), and recognition (prativijnāna). These distinctions are made only in thought but not in experience.

2. What are Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Stages of Pratyaksa?

Ans: A perception is considered as indeterminate when we can't determine its features like colour, shape, size, etc. In this case, the sense organs contact with the object and a particular knowledge immediately emerges. Nyāyikas named this knowledge is 'avyakta' which means it can't explain through our vocabulary. In other words, we can't express about the object accurately and clearly. This sort of knowledge arises when self has merely an awareness of the object without having any concrete knowledge of its name, form, qualities, etc. It is basically an underdeveloped form of perception. Its existence is only proved through inference, not by perception.

Determinate perception unlike indeterminate perception arises when the knowledge of an object consists of characters, such as; name, colour, shape etc. It gives knowledge of the object, as a result, we cognize 'It is a tree', 'He is a man' etc. In this case, an individual can identify and cognize the object as it is.

3. What are the different classifications of Pratyaksa?

Ans: There are two types of perception; ordinary perception (laukika) and extraordinary perception (alukika). Ordinary perception is further divided in two sorts; external (bāhya) and internal (mānas). External Perception has five distinctions because it is connected with five sense organs - auditory, visual, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory. In case of internal perception, the contacts occur between mind and the object. As a result, knowledge produces. Examples of internal perceptions are; feeling, desiring, wishing, etc.

Extraordinary perception (alukika) is a perception that provides knowledge even without the senses-object contact. In other words, this sort of perception arises whenever the contacts between sense organs and objects occur in an unusual manner. Nyāya recognizes three kinds of extraordinary perception. These are; a. Sāmānyalaksana b. Jñānalaksana c. Yogaja

Sāmānya laksana is the perception of universals. In other words, it is the perception of classes. According to Nyāya, the universals are a distinct class. They inhere in all the particular belonging to the same class. For example, a hen becomes a hen because it has the universal 'henness' inhering in it. Another example, we identify a person as 'man' because that person possesses the common

quality of 'manhood' which we find among other men. In our day-to-day life we perceive only particulars like a table, a cow, a pen etc. but not universals like tableness, cowness, penness, etc. Thus, it is admitted that whenever we perceive the particulars we first perceive the universal which inheres in it. These sorts of perception Nyāyikas treats as an extraordinary perception.

Jñānalaksana perception is a perception through complex association. In this case, an object is not directly presented to the sense organs, but it is retrieved in memory through the past cognition of it and is perceived through representation. For example, the ice looks cold, the fire looks hot, etc. Suppose that a person has in the past experienced a piece of ice, its colour and its coldness. Owing to such invariable association of touch and colour, the person presents in his visual perceptions of ice and its coldness. This results him to say, ice looks cold.

Yogaja perception as an extraordinary perception is found in yogis who possess supernatural power. Yogis through their power of meditation can have intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, past, present, and future. Yogaja perception as an extraordinary perception is found in yogis who possess supernatural power. Yogis through their power of meditation can have intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, past, present, and future.

Again, perceptions are divided in three sorts. These are, indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa), determinate perception (savikalpa), and recognition (prativijnāna). These distinctions are made only in thought but not in experience. Now let us discuss indeterminate perception.

A perception is considered as indeterminate when we can't determine its features like colour, shape, size, etc. In this case, the sense organs contact with the object and a particular knowledge immediately emerges. Nyāyikas named this knowledge is 'avyakta' which means it can't explain through our vocabulary. In other words, we can't express about the object accurately and clearly. This sort of knowledge arises when self has merely an awareness of the object without having any concrete knowledge of its name, form, qualities, etc. It is basically an underdeveloped form of perception. Its existence is only proved through inference, not by perception.

Determinate perception unlike indeterminate perception arises when the knowledge of an object consists of characters, such as; name, colour, shape etc. It gives knowledge of the object, as a result, we cognize 'It is a tree', 'He is a man' etc. In this case, an individual can identify and cognize the object as it is.

The senses contact with the object and recalled that whether the same object had been encountered earlier or not. If it had encountered in the past and positively recapitulating the situation and the features of the object then it would be considered as recognition. For example, Mr. Ranjeet saw Dr. Biplab after a long time and recognized him. Here, Mr. Ranjeet would be able to do so because he encountered Dr. Biplab in an academic conference five years back. In that time they had spent a very lighter and beautiful moment together. All these events are remembered by Mr. Ranjeet. So

once he saw Dr. Biplab he said hey! Are you Dr. Biplab? I am Ranjeet my self. Do you remember we met five years back in a conference? By listening from Ranjeet Dr. Biplab said oh! Yes. I remember you, even I remember the moment that we had spent together. This sense of knowledge is called recognition. In this knowledge there is always an element of immediate experience, e.g., Mr. Ranjeet met Dr. Biplab after a long time in a particular place.

UNIT – II

Pratyaksa – Definition

Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Stages of Perception

Classification of Pratyaksa

1. What is perception ?

Ans: Perception is a kind of cognition which arises from the contact of a Sense organ with its object in expressible by words, unerring and well defined.

2. What are the factors involved in the act of perception?

Ans: Senses (Indriyas) Their objects (Artha) The conduct of the Senses with these objects (Sannikarsa) Cognition produced by this conduct (Jnanam).

3. How do the Naiyayikas divide Pratyaksa?

Ans: The Naiyayikas, divide pratyaksa into Laukika or ordinary and Alaukika or extraordinary.

4. What are the 2 kinds of ordinary perception?

Ans: External perception (Bahya Pratyaksa) and Internal or mental perception (Manas Pratyaksa).

5. How many kinds of ordinary perception there according to the Naiyayikas?

Ans: According to the Naiyayikas there are 6 kinds of ordinary perception: Visual (Caksusa) Auditory (Srota) Gustatory (Rasana) Olfactory (Ghranaja) Tactual (Sparsana) Mental (Manasa)

6. What are the 3 kinds of extra ordinary perceptions?

Ans: Samanya Laksana, Jnana Laksana, Yogaja.

7. Name the two kinds of perception which are based on representation?

Ans: Indeterminate (Nirvikalpaka) and Determinate (Svavikalpaka)

8. What is Pratyaksa or Perception according to Nyaya philosophy? Mention different kinds of perception.

Ans: Gautama defines perception as non-erroneous cognition which is produced by intercourse of the sense organs with the objects, which is not associated with the name and which is well defined. This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the intercourse of sense organs with the objects. Hence, Vishwanatha defines perception as direct or immediate knowledge or the cognition which is not derived through the medium or instrumentality

of any other cognition. This definition includes ordinary as well as extraordinary perception and excluded inference, comparison and testimony.

The Naiyayikas have classified perception in different ways. There has been a distinction between *laukika* or ordinary and *Alaukika* or extraordinary perception. This definition depends on the way in which the senses come in contact with their object. Perception again is of two kinds, namely external and internal. The former is due to the external senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. The latter is brought about by the men's contact with physical state processes. We have 6 ways of *laukika* or ordinary perception, namely the visual, the auditory, the textual, the gustatory, the olfactory and the internal or mental perception. Extraordinary perception or *Alaukika pratyaksha* is of three kinds, namely *samanya lakshana*, *jnana laksana* and *yogaja*. According to another classification ordinary perception is of two kinds, namely *nirvikalpa* or the indeterminate and *savikalpaka* or the determinate.

9. What is extraordinary perception? Discuss briefly the various kinds of extraordinary perception.

Ans: According to Nyaya, perception is of two kinds, namely *laukika* or ordinary and *Alaukika* or extraordinary perception. When the sense organs come into contact with the object present to them in the usual way we have the *laukika* perception. In *Alaukika* perception the object is not ordinarily present to sense but is conveyed to them through an unusual medium. Extraordinary perception or *Alaukika* perception is of three kinds, namely *samanya lakshana*, *jnana lakshana* and *yogaja*. *Samanya lakshana* perception is the perception of the universal. According to nyaya the universals are a distinct class of reals. They inhere in the particulars which belong to different classes on account of the different universal inhering in them. An individual belongs to a particular class because the universals of that class inhere in it. Thus, a cow becomes a cow because it has the universal coldness inhering in it. Ordinarily we perceive only the particulars and not the universals. We perceive particular cows but we do not perceive a universal cow.

The second kind of extraordinary perception is called *jnana lakshana*. It is the complicated perception through association. Sometimes different sensation become associated and form one integrated perception. Here an object is not directly presented to a sense organ but revived in memory through the past cognition of it and is perceived through representation, for example, I look at a blooming rose from a distance and say I see a fragrant rose. Fragrance can be perceived by the sense organ of smell and not by the sense organ of vision which can perceive only color. Here the visual perception of the rose revives in memory. The idea of fragrance by association which was perceived in the past to the nose. The perception of fragrant rose through the eye is *jnana lakshana*.

The third kind of extraordinary perception is called *yogaja*. This is the intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, past present and future possessed by yogins through the power of meditation. In the case those who have attained spiritual perfections such intuitive knowledge of

all object is constant and spontaneous. In case of others who are on the way of perception, it requires the help of concentration as an ordinary condition.

10. Distinguish between determinate and indeterminate perception.

Ans: Nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception is a state of consciousness which gives us mere existence. Nirvikalpaka perception is the immediate apprehension, the mere awareness, the direct sense experience which is undifferentiated and non relational and is free from assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. When we for the first time in our life, perceive a jar we were simply conscious of its existence, but had no knowledge of its special features, its generic character etc. Here we have an indeterminate perception of jar.

Svavikalpaka or determinate perception implies a knowledge of the genus to which the perceived object belongs, of the specific qualities which distinguishes the individual object from the other members of the same class and of the union of the two. Determinate perception is relational apprehension. It is a perceptual judgment. There is subject predicate relation in it as it involves assimilation, discrimination and association. It is knowledge about an object. When we perceive orange as a substance endowed with qualities of color, a size, shape and the like bearing the name orange and belonging to the class oranges and distinct from other fruits, We have determined perception. In determinate perception we relate the substance with its attributes.

UNIT-III

Anumana and Concomitance (Vyapti)

Classification of Inference : Causal, Logical and Psychological

1. What does Anumana etymologically mean?

Ans: Anumana literally means the knowledge (Mana) which we get after other knowledge (anu).

2. How many propositions and terms are required by Anumana and what are they called?

Ans: Three propositions and three terms which are called constituents and avayavas of the anumana.

3. What is Vyapti?

Ans: Vyapti is the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major Term.

4. What is Paksadharmata?

Ans: The presence of Paksa in Hetu is called Paksadharmata.

5. Name the three terms of Anumana?

Ans: Paksa (minor term), Sadhya, (Major term), Hetu (middle term).

6. Name the five members of Pararthanumana.

Ans: prajña, hetu, udaharana, upanaya, and nigamana.

7. What does Vyapti literally mean?

Ans: Vyapti literally means pervasion.

8. What is vyapya and Vyapaka?

Ans: Vyapti implies a co-relation between two facts of which one is pervaded (Vyāpya) and the other pervades (Vyapaka).

9. What are the 2 kinds of Vyapti?

Ans: Sama Vyapti & Asama Vyapti.

10. Name the kinds of inference based on causal relation?

Ans: Pūrvavat and Sesavat.

11. What are the different classification of inference according to the new School of Nyaya?

Ans: Kevalanvayi, and kevalavyatireki and anvaya vyatireki.

12. Define Anumana. What is the structure of Anumana?

Ans: Anumana takes the form of syllogism. Anu means after and mana means knowledge which comes after some other knowledge. Anumana uses knowledge derived from perception or verbal testimony and arrives at something not given by perception. Anumana or inference as defined thus, is a process of reasoning in which we pass from the perception or some mark to the knowledge of something else by virtue of the relation of universal concomitance between the two, for example, The hill is fiery.

Because it smokes.

And whatever smokes is fiery.

In this example we pass from the perception of the mark smoke in the hill to the knowledge of the existence of fire in it by virtue of our previous knowledge of the universal concomitance between smoke and fire.

In every anumana there are three terms namely sadhya, paksha, hetu. These 3 terms correspond to the major term, minor term and middle term respectively of the Greek syllogism. Hetu is also called linger.

Anumana is that kind of process of reasoning which is preceded by the perception of hetu in the paksha and the remembrance of its invariable concomitance with the sadhya. So in the process of Anumana,

1. The first step is the apprehension of the hetu in the paksha.

2. The second step is the Recollection of the universal concomitance between the relation of hetu and sadhya.

3. The last step is the inferential knowledge of sadhya as related to in the paksha.

From these it appears that in anumana there must be at least three propositions which are all categorical and one must be affirmative and the others may be affirmative or negative. The first proposition corresponds to the conclusion. The second proposition corresponds to the minor premise and the 3rd to the major premise.

Thus we find that the order of arrangements and the propositions of anumana is the reverse of the arrangements of western syllogism.

13. What is vyapti? How is vyapti known or established?

Ans: The relation of invariable and unconditional coexistence between the middle term and the major term of an inference is technically called vyapti in Indian philosophy. For example, Devadatta is mortal.

Devadatta is a man.

Therefore all men are mortal.

In this inference, man is the middle and mortal is the major term. And the relation of invariable concomitance or coexistence between these two term is vyapti. Vyapti literally means the state of pervasion. It implies a coexistence between 2 facts someone named lee we appear which is pervaded and we are packer which is pervades.

Vyapti may be of two kinds, namely sama vyapti and ashama vyapti. A vyapti between 2 terms of equal extension is called sama vyapti. Here the vyapti holds between 2 terms which are coextensive so we may infer one of them from the other. For example, whatever is nameable is knowable and also whatever is knowable is nameable. A vyapti between two term of unequal extension, on the other hand, is called asama vyapti. The vyapti holds between 2 terms which are not coextensive. So from one we may infer the other but not vice versa. For example, wherever there is smoke there is fire but whenever there is fire there may not be smoke as in the case of red hot iron ball. Now the question is how is vyapti known or how do we get a universal proposition.

According to Carvaka there is no such problem because to them inference is not a valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists base the knowledge of universal proposition on the principles of causality and essential identity. The vedantins hold that the knowledge of vyapti is the result of an unscientific induction.

The Naiyayikas agree with the vedantins but unlike them they supplement uncontradicted experience by few more step. So, according to nyaya, vyapti can be established on the basis of observation of particular instances through the knowledge of the class essence underlying such particular instances.

14. What are the different classifications of Anumana?

Ans: The Naiyayikas gives us the different classification of anumana according to their different principles according to the purpose, which an inference serves, anumana is of two kinds, namely,

1. Swarthanumana is that in which we infer to acquire knowledge for our own selves. If we infer the existence of fire in the hill and perceiving smoke in the hill remembering the universal relation between the smoke and the fire, then it is called swathanumana.

2. Parathanumana, on the other hand is that in which we infer to demonstrate the truth of the acquired knowledge before others. It is a syllogistic expression which consists of five members.

They are

A . pratijna - the hill is fiery.

B. Hetu - for it has a smoke.

C. Udaharana - wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen.

D. Anayaya - the hill has smoke.

E. Nigamana - the hill is fiery.

According to the causal relation, anumana is of three kinds, namely,

1. Purvavat Anumana is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cost. For example, when we infer future rain from the perception of dark cloud in the sky our inference is purvavat.

2. Seshavat anumana is that in which we infer the unperceived Causeway from a perceived effect. For example, when we infer past rain from the perception of swift muddy current of the river, our inference is seshavat.

3. Samanyatadrsta anumana is that which is based on certain observed points of general similarity between the objects of experience. For example when a man infers cloven hoof of an unknown animal simply by seeing it's horn, we have an example of samanyatadrsta anumana.

According to the application of the method anumana is of three kinds, namely,

1. Kevalanvayi anumana is that in which the middle term is positively related to the major term. This means that there is agreement between the two terms in respect of presence, for example, All smoky objects are fiery. The hill is smokey. Therefore, the hill is fiery. Here, the middle term Smokey is positively related to the major term fiery.

2. Kevalavyatireki anumana is that in which the middle term is negatively related to the major term this means that there is agreement between the two terms in respect of absence. For example, No non fiery object Is Smokey. The hill is smoky. Therefore, the hill is fiery. Here, the middle term Smokey is negatively related with the major term non fiery.

3. Anvayi-vyatireki anumana is that in which the middle term is related to the major term both positively and negatively. For example, 1. All smoky objects are fiery. The hill is smoky. Therefore, the hill is fiery. 2. No non fiery object is smokey. The hill is smokey. Therefore the hill is fiery. In this example there is double agreement between middle and major term. They agree in presence in the positive instance and they also agree in absence in the negative instance.

UNIT-IV

Pramanas: Sabda and Upamana

1. What is Sabda?

Ans: Sabda is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (aptavakya) and consists in understanding its meaning. It is based on the words of trustworthy persons, human or divine. A person is trustworthy if he knows the truth and conveys it correctly. Sabda is interpreted as aptavacana. Testimony is valid if the source is reliable. It may come not only from the scriptures, but also from persons who are trustworthy (apta). Testimony is of two kinds- Vaidika and secular (laukika). The vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God. Secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error and so not infallible.

2. Explain Sabda according to Nyaya Philosophy.

Ans: According to the Nyāya Philosophy, sabda (verbal testimony) is the fourth and last valid source of knowledge. 'Sabda' literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentence. But all verbal knowledge is not valid. Thus, Nyāyikas expressed that sabda is a pramāna of valid verbal testimony.

Sabda is the instructive assertion of a reliable person. Now a question probably comes to your mind, i.e. who is a reliable person? A reliable person may be a risi, mlechha, arya who is an expert in certain matter and is willing to communicate his/her experience of it.

Example: Suppose that a lady came to the side of a river to cross the river and can't ascertain depth of water in the river. In this case, she asked a fisherman who is fishing there that 'can I cross the river?' Since the fisherman is a local person over there and has no enmity with her replied that you can cross the river easily. Here, the word of the fisherman is to be accepted as a means of right knowledge called verbal testimony.

3. What are the different kinds of Sabda?

Ans: Types of Sabda These are two different kinds of Sabda. a) i) Drustārtha ii) Adrustārtha b) i) Laukika ii) Alaukika

The former classification is made on the basis of objects of meaning and the later classification is based on the origin of words. Sabda deals with perceptible object is called drstārta, e.g. table is

brown, grows is green etc. A sabda deals with imperceptible object is called 'adrsta', e.g. Duty is god, Truth is noble, etc.

Laukika sabda is known as secular whereas alukika sabda is known as divine or vaidika. The Vedas are spoken by god. This vaidika testimony is divine and perfect. According to Nyāyikas, since human beings are not perfect only the words of trust worthy person can be considered as laukika sabda.

The verbal testimony is defined as that 'sentence in which the relation among the meaning of words, that is the object of its intention, is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge'. Verbal testimony is used as meaningful words or sentences. The mere combination of letters or the words don't provide a valid knowledge. Therefore, words and sentences must be used in a specific sense whose meaning will be clear, as a result, it would be treated as a valid pramana.

4. What is Upamana?

Ans: It is knowledge derived from similarity. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. According to the Nyāya Philosophy, comparison (upamāna) is the third source of valid knowledge. The expression 'upamāna', is derived from two words, 'upa' and 'māna'. The word 'upa' means similarity or 'sādrusya' and the word 'māna' means 'cognition'. Thus, generally speaking, upamāna as a source of knowledge is derived from the similarity between two things/objects. It is a source of knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation (what the word refers to).

Example of Upamāna: A person does not know what a 'squirrel' is? S(he) is told by a forester that it is a small animal like rat, but it has a long furry tail and strips on its body. After some period of time, when s(he) sees such an animal in the forest, s(he) knows that it is a squirrel.

5. What are the different steps involved in Upamana?

Ans: There are four steps involved in acquiring knowledge of an object in comparison (upamāna).

First: We have an authoritative statement that a word denotes objects of a certain description.

Second: When one observes any such objects she/he has the knowledge that it answers to the given description.

Third: There is a recollection of the descriptive statement received from authority.

Four/Finally: There is the resulting knowledge that, this kind of objects are denoted by the word is same.

In upamana, knowledge of an object is determined by comparing it form other similar kinds of objects. Thus roughly it is treated as analogy. For example, assume a situation where a man has not seen a gavaya or a wild cow and doesn't know what it is. A forester told him that a wild cow is an animal like a country cow but she is more furious and has big horn in her forehead. In a later period he comes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow by compairing the descriptions made by the forester. This knowledge is possible due to the upamana or comparison. Thus, upamana is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object it denotes by that name.

UNIT-V

Paratah Pramanyavada Theory of Error Fallacies (Hetabhasa)

1. What is Paratah Pramanyavada?

Ans: Knowledge or Cognition is defined as apprehension or consciousness. Nyaya believes that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object; they are quite distinct from knowledge. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects. Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it, so knowledge reveals all objects which come before it. Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge is defined as the right apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object as it is. Nyaya maintains the theory of correspondence (paratah pramanya). In Nyaya philosophy, Paratah pramanyavada focuses on the sources of valid knowledge. Paratah pramanyavada argues that knowledge is dependent on external sources or authorities for its validity. According to this school of thought, knowledge is not self-validating but needs to be justified or verified by external means.

2. Explain Paratahpram,anyavada.

Ans: Nyāya advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge called paratah prāmānya-vāda. According to it, knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of its validity or invalidity arises only after knowledge has arisen. The nature of knowledge is its correspo-ndence with its object. And the test of truth is fruitful activity (sadvādi-pravrtti). If

knowledge leads to fruitful activity, it is valid; if it does not, it is invalid. Validity and invalidity are not intrinsically connected with knowledge. They are the result of a subsequent test. Validity is due to excellence (guna) in the causes of knowledge and invalidity is due to defect (dosa) in the causes of knowledge. Vishvanātha says in his great commentary, Siddhantamuktavali; defects are the cause of invalid knowledge, and merits or guna is the cause of valid knowledge. Defects are said to be of various kind, viz. (an excess of) bile, distance, and so forth. Knowledge arises simply as knowledge and afterwards becomes valid or invalid due to extraneous condition.

Truth and falsehood are specific qualities of cognition. Cognition is the manifestation of some objects, which depends on certain causal condition, i.g. the operation of sense-organs. Now, while objects-manifestation is produced by certain general condition, truth and falsehood, which are specific features of object-manifestation, must be produced by some specific features of the general conditions. The specific features responsible for the production of truth and falsehood are the merits (guna) and demerits (dosa) of the conditions of knowledge respectively. Merits and demerits are additional features in the cause of cognition, which add the qualities of truth and falsehood respectively in cognition. But, merits and demerits are positive features. Merit is not merely an absence of demerit, nor is demerit a mere absence of merit. Hence truth and falsehood are not intrinsic or natural but extrinsic or adventitious. So, it is clear that, the generating conditions of the truth of knowledge are more than the generating conditions of the knowledge itself. On the other hand, the ascertainment of truth depends on some extraneous consideration just as its production depends on some extraneous factors. At the time of the origination of cognition there is no knowledge of its truth or falsehood. When the cognition of a blue object arises, the object is known to be blue; but the truth of the cognition is not known at that time, and subsequently when it is known it is not known independently because such knowledge depends on fruitful activity (pravrttisamarthya). Fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity (pravrttivisamvada) is the test of falsehood.

Naiyāyikas holds that the generating conditions of the truth of a knowledge are more than the generating conditions of the knowledge itself and it also holds that the apprehension of a knowledge does not always amount to the apprehension of its truth, yet they accept that, there are some cases of knowledge whose truth appears to be self-evident. The knowledge of familiar objects, e.g., my house, my body, etc., is known as true immediately at the time when it arises and we do not feel the need of verifying it by successful activity. Is, then, such knowledge intrinsically true? The Naiyāyika replies that the knowledge of truth in such cases is conditioned by familiarity and that it is not self-evident though it arises quickly. The truth of the knowledge of a new object

is ascertained on the ground of practical success to which it leads if it is true. When a new object is cognized repeatedly it becomes familiar and we need not test the truth of its cognition on subsequent occasions in the same way as when it was new. Truth in such cases is known through inference based on familiarity and not on successful activity.

3. What do you mean by theory of error in Nyaya Philosophy?

Ans: Nyāya School of Philosophy most likely had its origin in its attempt to formulate canons of argument for the use in debates, which pervaded the Indian philosophical scene for a long time. The Nyāya was first systematized by Gautama, also known as “Aksapada”, in his Nyaya Sutas (250-450 CE), which belong to the post-Buddhistic period. Nyāya literally means ‘going into a subject’, i.e., that analytical reasoning by which the mind is led to a conclusion. The word ‘nyāya’ popularly connotes ‘right’ or ‘Justice’ and hence, the Nyāya system is known as the science of right judgment or true reasoning. Technically the word ‘Nyāya’ means a syllogism (or a speech of five parts). It is a science of right knowledge, Pramāṇasastra. However at present Nyāya has two important sects, viz: prācīna (the ancient one) and the navīna/ navyanyāya (modern). The ancient Nyāya (prācīna) developed out of the Gautama Sutas. The Neo-Nyāya (the modern or navyanyāya) begins with Gangesa, the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi, the most remarkable among them being Ragunāth Siromani. Beginning with Gautama who belonged to the third century B.C, a number of thinkers have dwelt on the Nyaya account of error. There is no explicit mention of the term Anyathākhyati in Gautama’s sutas. But there are occasions referring to wrong judgments has commented on the sutas of Gautama. The comments of Vatsayana are defended by Uddyotākara (A.D.635) in his work known as Varttikā. Both Vātsayana and Uddyotākara have analyzed and differentiated wrong judgments from the right ones.

The first occurrence of the term ‘Anyathākhyati’ can be noted in Vācaspathi’s ‘Nyāya-Varttika – Tātpatryatikā’ which appears to be an annotation of Uddyotakara’s Varttika. Udayanacarya (of about the 10th century A.D) has commented on Tātpatryatikā of Vacaspati in his commentary known as ‘Tātparyaparisuddhi’. Gangesa who lived around 1200 A.D. was the founder of the Neo Nyayaschool. In his work known as Tattvachintāmaṇi, Gangesa has departed from the classical account of error and knowledge. Gangesa has also many followers and commentators among whom, Raghunātha Tarka Siromani, the author of Didhiti are in the forefront.

4. What is the etymological meaning of Anyathākhyati?

Ans: According to the Nyāya School of Philosophy error is known as Anyathakhyativada. Here ‘anyathā’ refers to some else from what it is, while ‘khyati’ denotes false knowledge. Thus this view indicates that the object of illusion is a real object that is seen by error as another real object

(Vātsayana Bhāṣya on Nyāya Sūtra iv.2.35). Anyathā khyāti was expounded by Gautama, the exponent of the Nyāya philosophy. Anyathā literally means 'Otherwise' or 'elsewise'. When shell is perceived as silver, the erroneous cognition consists in the fact that the shell is perceived otherwise i.e. as other than what it really is. Error is an instance of erroneous judgement resulting from mischaracterization. What is given out there, is a mere this which is characterised as silver. Error lies in our interpretation of the datum presented before. But it remains a piece of shell all through. The 'that' in the given datum is not denied.

What is denied is the predicate 'silver' which is attributed to it. Every judgement, true or false, does have a referent. Here, 'silverness' is wrongly predicated of the referent 'shell'. Error doesn't mean lack of referentiality (artha sunyatā). Thus, error lies in mispredication i.e. misjudging the shell as silver. In the judgement 'It is silver' the error lies in the predicative part of the judgement but not in respect of the referent. In erroneous cognition, a thing is judged to be what it is not. Correspondence is the test of truth. A propositional claim turns out to be true when it corresponds with what the world is like. Error ensues when the propositional content doesn't agree with or correspond to what is the case. Error, thus, is a subjective phenomena.

5. Explain Anyathākhyati .

Ans: According to Naiyāyikas all knowledge is presentative. Even in the illusory perception, silver is perceived. Such a view leads to the error being defined as the understanding of an object that does not have an attribute as one that possesses that attribute. This is a significant character of the old Nyāya maxim which holds that any judgment holds good so far as its subject is concerned. However, it may differ away from reality where its affirming element is concerned. Thus, the error happens to be a perceptual cognition of an object as distinct from what it is, and so it refers to thing that is outside of it. The usage of the terms 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' to denote anyatha is really a matter of error. One perceives a presented object else wise, while the existence of the represented object occurs somewhere else. It is further maintained that by nature anything known is not valid, but due to unrelated conditions (paratahpramāya) it becomes so during validity as well as invalidity. As held by this theory it will be seen that a real object is manifested as a different object which again happens to real. The understanding of an object differently is an error or illusion. In fact, it is the misunderstanding of one object like a shell for another object, like silver. This theory of erroneous cognition is also known as anyathakhyativada. The theory of error put forward by the Nyāya school is realistic and it treats the error as a single unitary perception. However, it has to be understood that all the qualities in the illusory judgment taken severally are real and only any identity presented between them is not real. The commentator of the Nyāya-Sūtra, Vātsayana is of

the opinion that no erroneous understanding could be treated as totally baseless. Thus the error in the context of anyathākhyati is not an experience of totally unrelated contents but is the erroneous understanding of two real entities of which one is mistaken for the other.

Nyāya view of erroneous cognition: An “illusion” according to the Nyāya School is a fact applied to a wrong context. An illusory perception encompasses real and perceived facts which have been wrongly related. An example is the illusory perception where the actual perception is that of a shell. However both are seen as real facts. In this instance, the silver perceived at some other time and locality leads to the occurrence of any errors, being occupied by the perceived shell. Alexander is of the view that error is consisted in the elements of reality getting wrongly combined. According to the Naiyāyikas, one cannot expect the concept of errors to clarify the perceptual error. But it can only reveal how the error is represented as a false characterization of objects.

As done by Vacaspati in his discussion about error Naiyāyikas too mention examples of erroneous perception like the shell and silver. Yet for all the Naiyāyikas explanation of error as mistaking one object for another (Sadantaramsadantaratanagrhayate) is indicative of what the theory logically implies. According to the Nyāya School, something seen as different from what it actually is happens in an illusion, as in the case of shell being mistaken as silver. Such mistaking could happen due to various causes such as insufficient light, or defective eyesight and the like, whereby the person concerned fails to recognize the actual nature of a nacre and understand it as something bright as silver. It is the effect of a real object being manifested in the form of a different object. The error is not due to the indeterminate perception of the person concerned but due to the determinate perception operated and changed by some elements that presented the object. One who perceives the qualities of silver in shell has an illusion which is a single cognition of a perceptual character. Shell in conjunction with a visual organ, aggravated by some defect and prompted by the recollection of silver tender to appear as silver itself. The sense of perception is bound to contact with something that is present before it. Although the sense understands the general features such as brightness etc. Which are present in the object before it due to some unforeseen defects, the peculiar and distinctive features of the object are not discerned. The general features of the object are not discerned.

Jñānalaksana Sannikarsa: The general features of the object being associated with something else, (Silver in this instance) receive the memory images of the special properties of silver is mooted by the revival of its impression by the perception of its interest brightness. This is explained by modern Nyāya through Jñānalaksana Sannikarsa. Hence in the case of illusion, the Jñānalaksana pratyakṣa is accepted by Naiyāyikas. Through the medium of the idea of silver recalled in memory and extraordinary intercourse related it is when the silver perceived somewhere else is referred to

as a predicate to this as its subject that error creeps in giving rise to the 'illusion' this is the determinate knowledge as inferred by silverness. When it comes to a matter of recognition (pratyabhijñā) one might refer to another person as the same man who helps him in some problem the previous day. Here one sees how certain elements of presentation and representation join together to produce one single perception. It is an instance of one kind of perception being qualified by a past perception. Here, one sees an object and recollection as to have seen it one some earlier occasion, whereby one is given the knowledge of how present objects are qualified by past events (Radhakrishnan, S.,1983:70) This way, one knows as immediately that the thing one cognized is the same as that which was cognized earlier. Memory and perception combine to produce such an effect. How a given sensor combines with associated ideas to make up one percept, is generally explicit in any ordinary valid perception.

6. What is hetvabhasa?

Ans: The fallacies of inference (hetvābhāsa) in Indian logic are all material fallacies. So far as the logical form of inference is concerned, it is the same for all inferences. There is, strictly speaking, no fallacious form of inference, in logic since all inferences must be put in one or other of the valid forms. Hence if there is any fallacy of inference, that must be due to the material conditions on which the truth of the constituent premises depends. It may be observed here that in the Aristotelian classification of fallacies into those in dictione and those extra dictionem there is no mention of the formal fallacies of inference like the undistributed middle, the illicit process of the major or minor term, and so forth. The reason for this, as Faton rightly points out, is that "to one trained in the arts of syllogistic reasoning, they are not sufficiently persuasive to find a place even among sham arguments." As for Aristotle's fallacies in dictione, i.e., those that occur through the ambiguous use of words, they are all included by the Naiyayika among the fallacies of chala, jāti and nigrahassthāna with their numerous subdivisions.

In Indian Logic, a material fallacy is technically called hetvābhāsa, a word which literally means a hetu or reason which appears as, but really is not, a valid reason. The material fallacies being ultimately due to such fallacious reasons, the Naiyāyikas consider all these as being cases of hetvābhāsa. According to the Naiyayika- 5 kas, there are five kinds of material fallacies. These are (1) Savyabhicara Satpratipaksa, (4) Asiddha, (5) Badhita.

7. Mention the different types of fallacies in Indian logic according to Nyaya.

Ans: The first kind of fallacy is called savyabhicara or the irregular middle. To illustrate:

All bipeds are rational;

Swans are bipeds

Therefore swans are rational.

The conclusion of this inference is false. But why? Because the middle term 'biped' is not uniformly related to the major 'rational'. It is related to both rational and non-rational creatures. Such a middle term is called *savyabhicara* or the irregular middle.

The *savyabhicara* *hetu* or the irregular middle is found to lead to no one single conclusion, but to different opposite conclusions. This fallacy occurs when the ostensible middle term violates the general rule of inference, namely, that it must be universally related to the major term, or that the major term must be present in all cases in which the middle is present. The *savyabhicara* middle, however, is not uniformly concomitant with the major term. It is related to both the existence and the non-existence of the major term, and is, therefore, also called *anaikāntika* or an inconstant concomitant of the major term. Hence from such a middle term we can infer both the existence and the non-existence of the major term. To take another illustration:

All knowable objects are fiery;

The hill is knowable;

Therefore the hill is fiery;

Here the middle 'knowable' is indifferently related to both fiery objects like the kitchen, and fireless objects like the lake. All knowables being thus not fiery, we cannot argue that a hill is fiery because it is knowable. Rather, it is as much true to say that, for the same reason, the hill is fireless. "The second kind of fallacy is called *viruddha* or the contradictory middle. Take this inference: "Air - is heavy, because it is empty." In this inference the middle term 'empty.' is contradictory because it disproves the heaviness of air. Thus the *viruddha* or the contradictory middle is one which disproves the very proposition which it is meant to prove. This happens when the ostensible middle term, instead of proving the existence of the major, in the minor, which is intended by it, proves its non-existence therein. Thus to take the *Naiyayikas'* illustration, if one argues. "Sound is eternal, because it is caused," we have a fallacy of the *viruddha* or contradictory middle. The middle term, 'caused' does not prove the eternality of sound, but its non-eternality, because whatever is caused is non-eternal. The distinction between the *savyabhicāra* and the *viruddha* is that while the former only fails to prove the conclusion, the latter disproves it or proves the contradictory proposition.

The third kind of fallacy is called *satpratipaksa* or the inferentially contradicted middle. This fallacy arises when the ostensible middle term of an inference is validly contradicted by other middle term which proves the non-existence of the major term of the first inference. Thus the inference "sound is eternal, because it is audible" is validly contradicted by another inference like this: "sound is non-eternal, because it is produced like a pot. Here the non-existence of eternality (which is the major term of the first inference) is proved by the second inference with its middle term 'produced' as against the first inference with its middle 'audible.' The distinction between the *viruddha* and the *satpratipakasa* is that, while in the former the middle itself proves the contradictory of its conclusion, in the latter the contradictory of the conclusion is proved by another inference based on another middle term.

The fourth kind of fallacy is called asiddha or sādhyasama, i. e. the unproved middle. The sadhyasama middle is one which is not yet proved, but requires to be proved, like the that the sadhyasama middle is not a proved or an established fact, but an asiddha or unproved assumption. The fallacy of the asiddha occurs when the middle term is wrongly assumed in any of the premises, and so cannot be taken to prove the truth of the conclusion. Thus when one argues, "the sky-lotus is fragrant because it has lotusness in it like a natural lotus," the middle has no locus standi, since the sky-lotus is non-existent, and is, therefore, asiddha or a merely assumed but not proved fact.

The last kind of fallacy is called bādhitā or the non-inferentially contradicted middle. It is the ostensible middle term of an inference, the non-existence of whose major is ascertained by means of some other pramāṇa or source of knowledge. This is illustrated - "Fire is cold because it is a substance". Here 'coldness' is the sadhya or major term, and 'substance' is the middle term. Now the non-existence of coldness, may more, the existence of hotness is perceived in fire by our sense of touch. So we are to reject the middle 'substance' as a contradicted middle. The fallacy of satpratipakṣa, as explained before, is different from this fallacy of badhita, because in the former one inference is contradicted by another inference, while in the latter an inference is contradicted by perception or some other non-inferential source of knowledge. Another example of badhita would be: Sugar is sour, because it produces acidity.